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Abstract
Theory of mind, also known as mindreading, refers to our ability to attribute mental states to agents in order to make sense of and interact with other agents. Recently, theorists in this literature have advanced a broad conception of mindreading. In particular, psychologists and philosophers have examined how we attribute knowledge, intention, mentalistically-loaded stereotypes, and personality traits to others. Moreover, the diversity of our goals in a social interaction – precision, efficiency, self/in-group protection – generates diversity in the mindreading processes we employ. Finally, the products of mindreading are varied, as well. We produce different sorts of mindreading explanations depending on our epistemic goals and the situational context. In this article, I piece together these different strands of research to present a broad conception of mindreading that is complex, messy, and interesting. 

Introduction
I will start this article in the most helpful but potentially least interesting way: with some definitions. Social cognition is a broad field of study. It investigates the cognitive processes that underpin interactions with others, including attention, perception, memory, affect, attribution, heuristics, biases, and prejudices. Several narrower fields of research fall under this umbrella. Folk psychology is the field of research that investigates our ordinary cognitive capacity to make sense of others’ behavior. This field includes research on the nature of our mental state concepts, what kinds of creatures possess mental state concepts, whether these concepts are learned or innate, and how and when we employ mental state concepts. Research on theory of mind is a subset of the research on folk psychology. Theory of mind refers to our cognitive capacity to attribute mental states in order to make sense of an agent’s behavior. We attribute, for example, beliefs, desires, and emotions to others. The literature on theory of mind includes debates about how we attribute mental states (theorizing vs. simulating), when children develop various mental state concepts, and atypical development of theory mind, such as in the case of autism. Though theory of mind is the standard term in the empirical literature, some in the empirical and philosophical literature now use the term mindreading to describe our ability to infer mental states (Nichols and Stich 2003). The term mindreading is preferred because “theory of mind” seems to suggest that we theorize about others’ mental states, which may beg the question against the Simulation Theory. For simplicity, I will use the term mindreading to refer to our ability to attribute mental states to others.​[1]​

My interest here is how philosophers and psychologists construe mindreading. Despite being a subset of the incredibly broad field of social cognition, theorists who study mindreading have tended to focus on just a few mindreading tasks.​[2]​ The empirical and philosophical literature mostly discuss how and when we attribute beliefs and desires for the purpose of explaining and predicting behavior. As I will explain, there is good reason to focus on these particular mindreading capacities as they may constitute core competencies of mindreading. However, recently mindreading theorists have moved beyond belief-desire psychology to incorporate research on in-grouping/out-grouping, stereotyping, character trait attribution, how the situational context and our personal goals influence our interpretation of others’ behaviors. These topics are commonly discussed in social cognition and social psychology and are clearly relevant to mindreading. However, until relatively recently, philosophers and psychologists have not engaged much with this kind of research. In what follows, I will describe the historical development of the narrow conception of mindreading and why and how theorists are broadening the conception of mindreading. 

The narrow conception of mindreading

To illustrate the narrow conception of mindreading, consider the philosophical and empirical research on the development of mindreading.​[3]​ The contemporary developmental literature is anchored in the false-belief task. The false-belief task was originally conceptualized by Daniel Dennett (1978) and experimentally implemented by Hans Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983). The basic rationale for the task is that if you want to know whether a subject has the concept of belief, a good way to figure this is out is to see whether a subject can attribute a false belief. False belief attributions imply that a subject understands that others can represent the world in a certain way (i.e., they believe the world is a certain way) and that this representation can be true or false. Passing this task may not be necessary for possessing the belief concept because a subject may fail the task for various reasons, but passing the task is supposed to be sufficient for possessing the belief concept. 

In a classic version of the false-belief task (the change of location task), subjects watch Sally, a puppet, place a toy in a basket and leave the scene. Next, they watch Ann, another puppet, come in and move the toy to the cupboard and then leave the scene. Finally, they watch Sally return to the scene, and then they are asked a series of questions to ensure that they remember what happened and know where the toy actually is. The key question in this version of the task is “where will Sally look for her toy?” A child counts as passing this task if she (A) remembers the sequence of events, (B) tells the experimenter where the toy actually is, and (C) answers that Sally will look for the toy in the basket. Almost all children tested can do (A) and (B). The test condition is (C). In order to succeed on (C), children must separate what they know about the location of the toy from what Sally thinks about the location of the toy. They must understand that Sally thinks the toy is in one location (the basket), and will look for it there, but actually the toy is in a different location (the cupboard). The ability to represent both how the world is and how another person represents (and sometimes misrepresents) the world is a core competency of folk psychology. Being able to attribute beliefs (both true and false) opens the door for a more wide range of mindreading capacities, such as elaborate pretense, irony, sarcasm, rational reconstruction of others’ reasons, etc. Thus, there is a good reason why theorists were so keen to figure out a way to test whether subjects truly possess the belief concept, and there are good theoretical reasons for emphasizing the importance of passing the false-belief task.

The theoretical reasons for focusing on the false-belief tasks were enhanced by some stark empirical findings. Developmental psychologists have found that before age 4 most children consistently fail this classic version of the false-belief test, but after age 4 most neurotypical children consistently pass this test. In particular, though all children remembered the sequence of events and can tell the experimenter where the toy is, it is not until age 4 that children are able to tell the experimenter that Sally will look for her toy in the wrong location. Further adding to the intrigue, subsequent studies showed that unlike neurotypical children, children with autism fail the false belief task (specifically, condition (C) above) even when their mental and verbal age is significantly greater than neurotypical children’s chronological age (Baron-Cohen 1995, 2000). Disorders like autism are particularly relevant to studying mindreading because they seem to show that the capacity for mindreading is independent from general intelligence. Mindreading seems to be a specialized tool for social interaction that is selectively impaired in autism. 

These results inspired decades of research on when, how, and why humans attribute belief to others. Psychologists and philosophers alike are still trying to determine what exactly passing and failing the so-called “standard false-belief task” signifies. Are patterns of failure and success on the false-belief task due to conceptual changes, language abilities, executive function skills, or some combination of these factors? It is hard to tell because the standard false-belief task is riddled with confounding factors. Passing this task requires facility with the belief concept, of course, but also sophisticated language and executive function skills (Bloom and German 2000). 

Critiques of the standard false-belief task inspired even more work on belief attribution. In response to the confounding factors in the standard false belief task, developmental psychologists constructed non-linguistic versions of the task that require no linguistic processing and are less taxing on executive function. The goal of these non-linguistic false-belief tasks is to isolate belief attribution from all the other cognitive processes that are involved in passing the standard false-belief task. In one version of this task, subjects watch an actor hide a toy in one of two locations. Next, a change occurs that results in the actor holding either a true or false belief about the toy’s location. Then the actor reaches for the toy in one of the two locations. 

The researchers theorize that if a subject attributes beliefs to the actor, she should be surprised when the actor behaves in ways that are not consistent with that belief and therefore look longer at those surprising events. In particular, subjects should look longer in two conditions: when the actor has a true belief about the toy’s location but reaches for the toy in the wrong location and when the actor has a false belief about the toy’s location but reaches for the toy in the correct location. If subjects look longer in these two conditions (and not in the true-belief/correct-location and false-belief/incorrect-location conditions), this is evidence that they tacitly attribute beliefs to others. Results from this non-linguistic false-belief tasks seem to show that 15- to 18-month-old infants infer false beliefs (Baillargeon, Scott, and He 2010, Onishi and Baillargeon 2005). Many more non-linguistic mindreading studies have been published since the first round of experiments. For a recent overview, see Scott and Baillargeon (2017). These studies seem to show that very young infants attribute mental states months and even years before was previously thought. Moreover, children with autism fail the non-linguistic false-belief tasks, as well (Colle, Baron-Cohen, and Hill 2007). Again, this highlights the importance of belief attribution in typical and atypical socio-cognitive development. 

This shift to non-linguistic versions of the false-belief task did not resolve all the issues, of course. If anything, there are more questions to answer about which mental state concepts are innate, which are acquired, and when. Though the debate between empiricism and nativism is ancient, it is a lively debate with these new, interesting, and controversial findings ​[4]​ There is vigorous debate about whether these non-linguistic false-belief tasks really are tracking belief attribution or a simpler representational state. Cecelia Heyes (2014) argues that we can explain infants passing these various non-linguistic false-belief tasks in terms of domain general learning and perceptual and “imaginal” novelty. If her view is right, then infants do not have even an implicit understanding of belief. Relying on a System 1/System 2 framework, Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill (2009) argue that infants’ performance on non-linguistic false-belief tasks can be explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. On this view, very young children are not attributing beliefs per se but rather some simpler representational state: registrations. Older children develop a more flexible but more cognitively demanding capacity to attribute proper beliefs, and the development of this capacity explains older children’s ability to pass the standard false-belief task. Josef Perner, one of the original architects of the standard false-belief task, argues that these findings suggest that before age 4 children’s understanding of belief is implicit. They can keep track of what agents perceive by building an experiential record, and they use this record to interpret and anticipate the agents’ behaviour (Perner and Roessler 2012). What they cannot do until they are about 4 years or older is use this experiential record to consider the correctness of the agent’s perception, or likely next action when there is an incorrect perception. This is just what the standard false-belief task requires. Thus, on Perner’s view, what we see at about 4 years old is a switch from an implicit understanding of belief to an explicit understanding. 

It is clear that there is a lot of really interesting empirical and philosophical work on this topic. Major themes include nativism vs. empiricism with respect to mental state concepts, mentalistic vs. non-mentalistic interpretations of these data, attribution of propositional attitudes vs. attribution of minimally mental representations vs. attribution of non-mental representations, viability of two-systems accounts, and spontaneous vs. effortful mindreading.​[5]​ There are at least two important takeaways from this discussion. First, this is a very lively and interesting interdisciplinary topic. There is a lot of great work being produced on the development of mindreading these days. Second, canvasing the debates about development of mindreading demonstrates just how focal belief attribution in particular is. 

Even developmental work on mindreading that is not entirely focused on the false-belief task tends to adopt a fairly narrow perspective on what counts as mindreading. Consider, for example, the research on a theory of mind scale, which aims to establish when children master various mindreading skills  ADDIN EN.CITE (Wellman and Liu 2004, Wellman, Fang, and Peterson 2011). Based on a meta-analysis of over 600 primary, longitudinal, and cross-cultural studies, Wellman and colleagues argue that there is a consistent developmental pattern in theory of mind skills. From roughly age 2 to 6, children progressively demonstrate understanding of discrepant desires (i.e., that desires can conflict), then discrepant beliefs (i.e., that beliefs can conflict), knowledge access (i.e., that something can be true but an agent may not know it), false belief (e.g., that an agent’s representation of the world does not match reality), and finally hidden emotions (i.e., that agents can experience an emotion even when there are no outward sign of it). Evidence suggests that children with autism have a different developmental pattern in theory of mind scale, particularly when it comes to false belief attribution (Peterson, Wellman, and Liu 2005).​[6]​ Though research on the theory of mind scale clearly focuses on more than just belief attribution, it is still a fairly narrow conception of our mindreading capacity. In fact, it is not even clear that the knowledge access tasks are probing knowledge rather than simply true belief vs. ignorance. Even so, the general point here is that the developmental literature often emphasizes just a handful of skills when characterizing mindreading. 

Belief and desire attribution are important elements of mindreading, after all. Indeed, they are widely regarded as the core components of mindreading.​[7]​ And we do attribute beliefs, desires, and emotions to explain and predict others’ behavior. At this point, you may wonder what the alternative is to a narrow conception of mindreading. In my recent book (Spaulding 2018b), I argue that the way in which we socially categorize people, whether we perceive others to be relevantly similar to us, the biases we bring to bear on a situation, the effects of situational context, our goals in a social interaction, the mindreading strategies we adopt, and the kind of explanation mindreading produces all can vary. This makes for an incredibly diverse set of mindreading practices. These various phenomena reflect diversity in the inputs, processing, and outputs of mindreading. In the next section, I will lay out the case for a broader conception of mindreading. 

Mindreading Broadly construed
In this section, I will canvas work that attempts to expand mindreading beyond its typical construal. There is exciting new work on when and how we attribute knowledge, intentions, character traits, and mentalistic stereotypes, all of which are forms of mindreading. 

Knowledge 
We employ various mental state concepts in action explanations: belief, desires, and emotions of course, but also knowledge. There is an expansive literature in experimental philosophy on knowledge attributions (Knobe and Nichols 2017). This research investigates how the stakes involved in a situation influence our attributions of knowledge. Work in experimental philosophy also explores the conditions under which we attribute knowledge vs. belief. Unsurprisingly, there are cases where we are willing to attribute belief but not knowledge, e.g., in cases where someone thinks that P is the case but lacks good reason for thinking that. Interestingly, there are also cases where we are willing to attribute knowledge but not belief. For example, subjects read about a student taking a history test who faces this question: “What year did Queen Elizabeth die?” The student has reviewed this date many times, but at that one moment, she is flustered by the pressure and can’t recall the answer. She therefore decides just to guess, and she writes down ‘1603.’ In fact, this is the correct answer. Subjects attribute knowledge in this case but they do not attribute belief.​[8]​

In the context of the debate about knowledge-first epistemology, some epistemologists have laid the groundwork for expanding the conception of mindreading to include attributions of knowledge. Jennifer Nagel (2017) introduces useful terminology that we can rely on here. Traditionally the mindreading literature has been concerned about when children develop the capacity to attribute true beliefs and false beliefs. Nagel argues that we should focus instead on the distinction between factive and non-factive states. Knowledge is factive state – it can only link an agent to truth – whereas belief is non-factive – it can link agents to truth or falsehoods. Traditionally, the mindreading literature has focused on when and how agents attribute non-factive states (true vs. false beliefs). Relying on evidence from linguistics, primatology, and developmental psychology, Nagel argues that attributing factive states is really quite different from attributing non-factive states. In particular, Nagel argues that there is good evidence that nonhuman primates have some ability to recognize factive states (knowledge in particular) but there is no convincing evidence that they can represent non-factive states (false belief or true belief that is not quite knowledge).​[9]​ Thus, the factive/non-factive distinction promises to be more useful than the standard true belief/false belief distinction.

Relatedly, John Turri (2017) argues that knowledge attributions play a different functional role in mindreading than belief (or, in Nagel’s terms, non-factive) attributions. Knowledge attributions lead to faster and more reliable behavioral predictions than belief attributions. This suggests that sometimes we attribute knowledge rather than belief to others when explaining and predicting their behavior, and these attributions serve different functions. 

Following experimental philosophers and epistemologists in the knowledge-first debate, we can see the value of expanding our conception of mindreading to include attributing knowledge (which is importantly distinct from non-factive states like belief).  

Intentions
Another important addition to the standard mindreading picture is intentions. When we are trying to explain or predict (or perhaps blame, moralize, or manipulate; more on this later), we may attribute intentions to a target rather than merely beliefs or desires. Intentions are dynamic mental states which have both representational and motivational aspects. Suppose, for example, I intend to go for a run. When I form the intention to go for a run, I represent my future as being a certain way, i.e., such that I will be running. In this way, intention is similar to belief. If I intend to run, I believe that I will run. In other words, intention entails belief. Furthermore, forming the intention to go for a run entails the motivation to go for a run. In this way, intention shares something in common with desires, which also are motivational. But intentions differ from desires, as well. Once I form the intention to go for a run, I settle the question of whether I will run. All else equal, once I form the intention to run, I will run. I can desire to go for a run without forming the intention to run. (This happens to me a lot.) Attributing an intention involves attributing something more than just belief (though it entails belief), and it is different from attributing desire. When we attribute intentions to a target on the basis of her behavior, we aim to make sense of what she is trying to do.​[10]​ And this is an importantly different form of mindreading from attributing beliefs and desires. 

Expanding our conception of mindreading to include knowledge and intention attribution is fairly straightforward. Attributing these mental states is not so different from attributing beliefs and desires. Indeed, some psychologists and philosophers have written on intention attribution in theory of mind paving the way for the expansion of mindreading (Malle, Moses, and Baldwin 2001). In the developmental literature, psychologists debate when when infants’ ability to detect and represent goal-directed behavior becomes genuinely mentalistic. György Gergely and Gergely Csibra (2003)  for example, argue that 12 month old infants can detect and represent goal-directed behavior, but they do so in a non-mentalistic way. Infants assume a principle of rational action, according to which actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. This framework implies that infants can employ an inferential principle of rationality to understand actions, but it is not a mentalistic inferential principle. On their view, genuine intention attribution occurs significantly later in early childhood.​[11]​ 

The works canvassed in the last two sections lay the framework for incorporating knowledge and intention attribution into the conception of mindreading. Indeed, knowledge and intention are fairly straightforward expansions because they are so closely connected to belief-desire psychology. In contrast, the mental state attributions I will discuss below differ quite a lot from the standard belief-desire psychology conception of mindreading.

Character Traits and Stereotypes
In addition to the above mental states, we also attribute mentalistically loaded character traits and stereotypes. Character trait and stereotype attribution are based on social categorization, the reflexive, rapid sorting of people into social categories. Categorizing individuals as part of a social category itself is not mindreading – it is not the attribution of mental states – but it is extremely relevant to the sorts of mental states we consider attributing to targets. So, how does social categorization work?

When we encounter other people, we habitually and rapidly sort them into various social categories, e.g., age, gender, race, nationality, religion, and class. The most salient categories tend to be age, gender, and race, and we can sort people into these categories in a fraction of a second (Ito, Thompson, and Cacioppo 2004, Liu, Harris, and Kanwisher 2002). However, the categories we employ can be modulated by various factors, such as context, cognitive load, and our goals (Wheeler and Fiske 2005, Gilbert and Hixon 1991). Thus, which social categories are most salient to us in a given situation will vary depending on the broader context. 
 
On the basis of social categorization, we spontaneously infer character traits, such as trustworthiness, competence, aggressiveness, dominance (Olivola and Todorov 2010, Rule, Ambady, and Adams Jr 2009). Character trait attributions are mentalistically loaded inferences about a target’s personality. We can make such character trait inferences very quickly, within a second or two, even when we are under cognitive load (Todorov and Uleman 2003, Malle and Holbrook 2012). These rapid character trait inferences turn out to be fairly accurate (Palomares and Young 2017).  

To see how character trait inferences are a form of mindreading, consider the following example. Suppose you meet Judy for the first time. Judy is a grandmother. Based on her facial expressions and behavior, you infer that Judy is nurturing. This, of course, is not a foregone conclusion about grandmothers. Some are nice but not really nurturing, some are distant and uninvolved, and some are mean. Grandmothers, like all people, can have very different character traits. When you infer that Judy is nurturing, you are not simply making an inference about her behavior, e.g., that she will buy gifts for her grandchildren, text and call regularly, etc. For one can buy gifts resentfully and text and call only from a sense of obligation. When you infer that Judy is nurturing, you implicitly attribute to her certain kinds of cares, desires, and emotions. If you predict that Judy will buy gifts for her grandkids, it is because you assume that Judy cares deeply about her grandkids, wants them to know she loves them, and feels happy when she can bring them special treats. That is, when you make character trait inferences – and make behavioral predictions on the basis of these character trait inferences – you are mindreading. 

Some theorists treat mental state attribution and trait attribution as distinct phenomena. For example, Joanna Korman and Bertram Malle (2016) investigate whether people offer mental state-based or trait-based explanations more frequently when encountering puzzling behavior. They argue that mental state-based explanations serve a different function from trait-based explanations, and we tend to offer the former more frequently when encountering puzzling behavior. This argument is compatible with my argument that at least some trait attributions imply mental state attributions and are therefore a form of mindreading. To see this, let’s revisit the example described above. In the example, we explained Judy’s behavior by offering a trait-based explanation: she’s nurturing. I argued this explanation implies certain mental states (though of course we may not explicitly consider the implied mental states when offering the trait-based explanation). Suppose, however, one time when Judy visits, she does not bring gifts and generally is in a cranky mood. In this kind of case, we would be inclined to look for a special reason why she is behaving out of character. We would offer a mental state-based explanation. Perhaps she thinks her grandchildren do not appreciate her gifts. In general, our explanations may explicitly reference traits or mental states depending on the context, but this is compatible with there being significant overlap in the two. And indeed there is some evidence that representing traits and representing mental states have a common neural basis (Thornton and Mitchell 2017).

Social categorization also forms the basis for social stereotype attribution. The social categories we sort people into are associated implicitly and explicitly with various features, and these associations ground social stereotypes. Stereotypes are conceptually rich systems of belief about social groups (Liberman, Woodward, and Kinzler 2017). Stereotypes can be positive, negative, or neutral beliefs about members of particular social groups. In all sorts of interactions, we rely on stereotypes about how individuals from particular social groups behave. Relying on stereotypes, helps us interpret an individual’s behavior quickly and efficiently, and it helps us anticipate what that individual will do next (Westra 2017b).​[12]​ 

Not all stereotype attributions are forms of mindreading. Some stereotypes simply refer to behavior, e.g., how certain social groups dress. These stereotypes do not explicitly or implicitly reference mental states. We may rely on these stereotypes to explain behavior. For instance, if someone asks why an individual is wearing a headscarf, we may explain that she is an Orthodox Jew, and in this religion married women wear modest clothing including headscarves. This stereotype-based explanation does not involve mindreading. However, some stereotypes do reference mental states, and these stereotypes are forms of mindreading. Fiction provides useful illustrations of this kind of mindreading. Consider for example the stereotypes prevalent in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. The characters in this novel attribute, exhibit, and defy social stereotypes about gender, marriage, and class. The first line of this book is, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.” This stereotype about what men want is attributed to various single men in the novel. Mr. Bingley exemplifies this stereotype, whereas George Wickham defies it, and Mr. Darcy ultimately conforms to this stereotypical belief as well. Their behaviors are deemed appropriate or odd or horrible in light of this stereotype about what they want in life. Of course, much of the book focuses on the stereotypes about what women want – women want a husband, young single women want to marry wealthy men, and mothers of daughters want to marry their daughters to wealthy men. Mrs. Bennet epitomizes this stereotype. She wants to marry her daughters to wealthy men regardless of whether it would be a happy marriage, and she finds it difficult to understand women who challenge this stereotype. When Elizabeth Bennet resents and resists conforming to the stereotype that she, as a young, single woman, wants only to marry a wealthy man, it surprises and frustrates those around her. These fictional examples demonstrate that stereotype attribution can be a form of mindreading, i.e., they can be a form of attributing mental states in order to explain and predict (and moralize or manipulate) behavior. 

In real life, we spontaneously attribute character traits and employ mentalistically loaded stereotypes in interpreting and anticipating others’ behavior (Uleman, Adil Saribay, and Gonzalez 2008). Character traits and stereotypes help us rapidly form expectations for how certain individuals will behave. Even when we interpret or anticipate behavior that deviates from the stereotype, it is often against the backdrop of a relevant stereotype. We sometimes are surprised by others’ behaviors precisely because we were interpreting them in light of a stereotype that they ended up not fitting. This is an important form of mindreading that is relatively unacknowledged in the mindreading literature. Though some empirical work investigates character trait​[13]​  and stereotype attribution​[14]​ in ways that make it clear that they are relevant to mindreading, and some newer philosophical work connects them directly  ADDIN EN.CITE (Westra 2017a, b), by and large most philosophical and empirical work on mindreading neglects these important and common forms of mindreading.

The Products of Mindreading
In the previous section, I discussed the ways in which some empirical and philosophical work is broadening the standard conception of mindreading to include mental state attributions beyond belief and desire. In this section, I will argue that we should further expand the purpose and products of mindreading. Typically, theorists investigating mindreading take the goal of mindreading to be accurately and precisely understanding a target’s mental states, and the product of mindreading to be explanation (in particular, teleological explanation) and prediction. Although we do aim for accuracy and precision, and we do attribute mental states to generate teleological explanations and predictions, this captures only part of mindreading. There is much more variety and nuance in our day-to-day mindreading practices. 

The Goals of Mindreading
To start, let’s consider the different goals that motivate mental state attributions. Sometimes we aim for accuracy and precision. When I am interviewing a potential new nanny, for example, I really want to know what the nanny thinks. In these sorts of cases, it really matters that we understand the other person’s thoughts, goals, and character traits. When it is important to us to get it right, when something significant hangs on getting it right, when the behavior we are observing is unusual, we pursue mindreading strategies that (we assume) will give us an accurate and precise view of the target’s mental states  ADDIN EN.CITE (Fiske and Neuberg 1990, Tetlock 1992, Kelley 1973). Most philosophical and empirical discussions of mindreading take what I will call accuracy-oriented mindreading as the default example of mindreading. In cases where we care to get it right, we tend to deliberate about the target’s behavior and mental states. 

We often do not have accuracy and precision as our primary goals in mindreading. Sometimes, what matters more than getting it exactly right is that we exert minimal cognitive effort to get a good enough approximation of the target’s mental states. When I am running through my neighborhood, seeing various neighbors working in their yards, walking their dogs, checking their mail, I do not invest a lot of thought into why they are doing what they are doing. Precision does not matter that much in such circumstances. When we are in a familiar context, when little hangs on getting it right, and when we are under cognitive load, we will adopt mindreading strategies that are efficient (Fiske and Taylor 2013, 177-199). Efficiency-oriented mindreading can take the form of projecting our own mental states to individuals we regard as relevantly similar to us, or stereotyping individuals that we regard as relevantly dissimilar to us (Ames 2004a, Ames 2004b).

In other contexts, our goals for mindreading are neither accuracy, precision, nor efficiency but rather self-interest. Sometimes, we want to manipulate what someone thinks. We need not invest a lot of cognitive energy in figuring out exactly what they think. Instead, we work on getting them to believe, desire, feel, etc. a certain way (McGeer 2007, Zawidzki 2013). In these cases, we are not really even interested in explaining or predicting what a target thinks. In such cases, the attribution of mental states is aimed at regulating or shaping what a target thinks. In the middle of a dinnertime struggle with my toddler, when I tell my daughter that she likes grilled cheese sandwiches, and remind her that just five minutes ago she wanted a grilled cheese sandwich and that is why I made her one, I am aiming to change her behavior rather than explain or predict it. That is, I am attributing mental states to her in order to get her to behave rationally. This kind of folk psychological regulating or “mind shaping” is not just aimed at kids. We do this, in more subtle ways, with our loved ones, colleagues, and friends. Thus, when we aim to manipulate, shape, or regulate others’ thoughts and behavior, mindreading is quite different than is typically recognized in the mindreading literature. 

Other times, we are motivated by self or in-group preservation. This occurs especially in the context of a threat to values or resources (Dunning 1999, Kunda 1990). In these cases, mental state attribution adheres to patterns described by the cognitive biases naïve realism and self/group-serving attribution bias. Naïve realism refers to our assumption that those who are different from us, or those who disagree with us, are biased and misperceiving the world, whereas we see the world as it really is (Pronin, Lin, and Ross 2002, Pronin 2007). For instance, we might say of someone who disagrees with us, “He only believes that because of X,” where X is some inappropriate and irrelevant factor and hence a sign that the belief is unjustified. Self/group-serving attribution bias describes our tendency to take credit for our (or our in-group’s) successes and deny responsibility for our (or our in-group’s) failures (Brewer and Brown 1998, Pettigrew 1979). These biases generate a particular pattern of thinking: we judge that the success of out-group members results from situational factors outside of their control, such as good luck and bias for them, and we judge that the failure of out-group members results from internal flaws of character, intelligence, or talent. In contrast, one judges the success of oneself or one’s in-group to be the result of internal strengths of character, intelligence, and talent, and one judges the failure of oneself or one’s in-group to be the result of situational factors outside of their control, such as bad luck and bias against them. 

These are general cognitive biases that also appear in mindreading. For instance, with naïve realism, the mindreader infers that the target’s beliefs are inappropriately biased by consideration of irrelevant factors, while she simultaneously assumes that her own beliefs are not similarly biased. For self/group-attributional biases, the mindreader engages in different patterns of explanation depending on whether the target is part of her in-group or an out-group. She references exculpatory mental states in explaining her own/in-group behavior and infers incriminating mental states in explaining out-group behavior.

Types of Explanation
We have just established that we have various goals in mindreading, and these goals correspond to different mindreading strategies. The goals that motivate mindreading also generate different types of explanations. Though there are many different ways to categorize explanations, I will use the following taxonomy, derived from Aristotle and fruitfully employed in the psychological literature: teleological explanations, mechanistic explanations, and formal explanations  ADDIN EN.CITE (Lombrozo 2012, Lombrozo and Carey 2006, Dennett 1987). 

Teleological explanations cite functions or goals. For example, one might explain why I walk to the refrigerator by saying that I want a glass of water. Mechanistic explanations cite proximal causes. In explaining my walking to the refrigerator, one might cite changes in lamina terminalis (a set of interconnected brain structures that control thirst) that motivate the drive to consume water and have cascading effects on motor processes. Formal explanations cite kind membership and norms. A formal explanation of my behavior might say that I am thirsty, and that is just what thirsty people do; they go get a drink of water.​[15]​ 

The examples above are different types of explanations of a target’s behavior. They are teleological, mechanistic, or formal explanations of why I walk to the refrigerator. We may also aim to explain a target’s mental states. That is, we may offer teleological, mechanistic, or formal explanations of why I desire water. A teleological explanation of my mental state aims to pick out the goals that cause me to want water. For example, I desire water because I have the goal of being healthy and I think I need to drink more water to be healthy. A mechanistic explanation of my mental states aims to explain my mental states by reference to proximal causes of those mental states, which may include particular neurological causes, other mental states, sensations, the perceptual environment, etc. For example, I desire water because when blood plasma volume decreases neural mechanisms activate sensations of thirst. A formal explanation of my mental states aims to categorize a target’s mental states as typical of certain groups. For example, I desire water because I am a runner, and runners tend to want to drink a lot of water.  

The various types of explanation, both of behavior and of mental states, clearly are not mutually exclusive. Which type of explanation you generate or find satisfying will depend on your goals and the context. Tania Lombrozo and Susan Carey argue that the psychological function of explanation is to provide information that can be exported to novel cases   ADDIN EN.CITE (Lombrozo and Carey 2006, Vasilyeva, Wilkenfeld, and Lombrozo 2017).​[16]​ We prefer explanations that provide information that we can use in generalizations, predictions, and future interventions we expect to make. 

When a task involves identifying the function or goal of some thing or phenomena, teleological explanations are regarded as better than other kinds of explanations. Teleological explanations are the default type of explanation; they come most naturally to children and adults (Lombrozo 2012). Perhaps this is because functions and goals are intuitively useful for generalizing, predicting, and intervening. However, in some contexts, mechanistic and formal explanations are more appropriate. When we want to figure out the causal origin of some thing or phenomenon, we prefer mechanistic explanations. In these cases, information about proximal causes provides useful information for future inferences and interventions. In other cases, when we are interested in categorizing things or phenomena, formal explanations are most appropriate. 

Typically, mindreading is construed as producing only teleological explanations. When we cite beliefs and desires in explaining a target’s behavior, this is often a teleological explanation. And, indeed, teleological explanations are the default for mindreading (as they are in general). However, mindreading can involve any of these types of explanations. 

Consider stereotypical explanations, which are a kind of formal explanation. As discussed above, some stereotypes involve mental state attribution. We sometimes offer stereotypical explanations of others’ behavior and mental states. Why does Mrs. Bennet ask Mr. Bennet to call on Mr. Bingley, the new wealthy bachelor in town? And why is she frustrated when Elizabeth turns down Mr. Darcy’s marriage proposal? One may explain her behavior and her mental states by citing the stereotype of an upper middle-class mother (in 19th century England), a stereotype that Mrs. Bennet exemplifies. Stereotypical formal explanations interpret a target’s behavior and mental states in terms of a more general category, which allows us to make predictions about future behavior. We generate or accept these explanations when we are motivated more by efficiency than precision and accuracy, when we are more interested in categorizing the behavior as part of a more general pattern than intervening on an individual’s future behavior. We may be interested in categorization when we are moralizing about a behavior, social signalling, or protecting our self/in-group image, motivations which are not mutually exclusive. 

Though they may be less frequent than teleological or formal mindreading explanations, in some contexts mechanistic mindreading explanations may be most appropriate. Mechanistic mindreading explanations attribute mental states as proximal causes (as opposed to functions/goals or as an instance of a social category). We may generate or accept mechanistic mindreading explanations when we are motivated to understand the precise causes of a behavior or mental state, such as when the behavior is particularly puzzling. For instance, one may explain Othello’s acute jealousy by citing his belief that his wife is cheating on him with his closest friend. This (false) belief is the proximal cause of Othello’s intense jealousy and rage.

This brief taxonomy of explanations demonstrates that there is quite a bit of variety even when we focus just on mindreading explanations. Depending on the context and our goals, we may employ different kinds of explanations. This diversity in mindreading is underappreciated in the mainstream mindreading literature, but it could help us understand in debates about whether mindreading is involved in social interpretations. Some theorists who are critical of the idea that we frequently engage in mindreading cite stereotypical explanations or social-role-based explanations as alternatives to mindreading explanations (Andrews 2012, Zawidzki 2013). These views presuppose that all mindreading explanations are teleological and thus when a subject produces a different kind of explanation, it is not a case of mindreading. However, if the view presented in this section is correct, then mindreading explanations can take several different forms, and the absence of a traditional teleological explanation is not evidence of an absence of mindreading.

CONCLUSION
Traditionally, discussion of mindreading focused on attributing beliefs and desires to (teleologically) explain and predict behavior. We do engage in such mindreading, and in some ways, it is reasonable to center the discussion of mindreading on belief-desire psychology. However, there is much more diversity to the goals, approaches, and products of mindreading. 

We may have many different goals when we engage in mindreading, including accuracy and precision, social manipulation, efficiency, and self-interest. We may have more than one of these goals in any given social interaction, and they may shift in priority as the social interaction proceeds. These goals correspond to distinct strategies for mindreading, including deliberation, mind-shaping, heuristics like projecting and stereotyping, and various kinds of motivated reasoning. We may adopt multiple mindreading strategies, which may also shift as our goals and/or the interaction evolves. We attribute many different types of mental states in mindreading, including beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, knowledge, character traits, and mental stereotypes. Finally, the mindreading explanations we produce vary by our goals and the context of mindreading. We often produce teleological mindreading explanations, which serve certain kinds of inductive functions. But in other contexts, we may also produce formal and mechanistic mindreading explanations. Mindreading, in sum, is a diverse psychological phenomenon. 
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^1	  For the sake of space, I will focus on the research on third-person human mindreading. I will not discuss the research on non-human animals or first-person mindreading/introspection.
^2	  I am not the first person to point out the restrictive conception of mindreading. Several psychologists have lamented the disconnect between research on mindreading and research on social cognition and social psychology (Apperly 2012, 837, Rakoczy 2014). I am not even the first philosopher to point this out. More than two decades ago, Barbara Von Eckardt (1997) argued that research on mindreading was surprisingly and unfortunately divorced from relevant research in social cognition and social psychology. 
^3	  This is not the only sub-field of mindreading research that focuses on mindreading narrowly construed. One can see this focus in debates about general theories of mindreading, pretense, and theory of mind in non-human animals. 
^4	  There are also some skeptics who argue that many of the crucial findings can’t be replicated (Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, and Liszkowski 2018). If that’s right, then there is no need to accommodate these data into our developmental timeline. This is not the place to analyze concerns about replication of non-linguistic theory of mind tasks. For more on this, there is a recent issue in Cognitive Development devoted to replication concerns. See especially Sabbagh and Paulus (2018), Baillargeon, Buttelmann, and Southgate (2018), and Poulin-Dubois et al. (2018).
^5	  There are overlapping debates about mindreading in non-human animals. Of particular relevance are debates about gaze tracking and what counts as evidence of mindreading vs. mere behavior reading. For a review, see Krupenye and Call (2019).
^6	  Some have used this theory of mind timeline findings to support knowledge-first accounts in epistemology (Nagel 2013). The rationale is that these findings (along with linguistic analyses) show that knowledge attributions come online prior to belief attributions. If knowledge is a compositional concept – perhaps with belief, truth, and other simpler concepts as components – then these findings are really puzzling. Why would children employ the complex concept prior to the simple concepts which compose the complex concept? One solution to this puzzle is to maintain that knowledge is basic, i.e., it is not decomposable into any simpler components. However, it is a matter of considerable debate whether or not this theory of mind scale timeline is accurate (Dudley 2018). Citing criticisms of the standard false-belief task, critics argue that we do not have good reason to think knowledge attribution precedes belief attribution. Further, the wealth of data from non-linguistic false-belief tasks is evidence that belief attribution emerges very early. This does not settle the debate about knowledge-first epistemology, of course. There are more sophisticated analyses of developmental data (in addition to linguistic analyses and data on non-human primates) that purport to be empirical evidence for knowledge-first accounts (Nagel 2017). 
^7	  Though some have argued that the concept of belief is not culturally universal (Bittner 2001, Wierzbicka 2006), there is good reason to think it is. In Spaulding (2018b), I argue that the linguistic analyses that support these arguments employ overly strict standards for what counts as a synonym of belief and what counts as a translation of belief. We can distinguish thin conceptions of belief and thick conceptions of belief (Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri 2015). Thin belief is a bare cognitive pro-attitude, i.e., just a representation that P is true or merely taking P to be true. A thick belief, in contrast, is a cognitive pro-attitude that additionally involves certain kinds of emotions or desire, e.g., the desire to sincerely assert or actively promote P. There is good reason to think that at least the thin conception of belief is universal. For example David Rose, et al. (2017) find that people from 26 different samples across 22 different countries take sincere assertions that P to be decisive for belief attribution even when non-linguistic behavior does not support that belief. This suggests that across many cultures, people possess the concept of belief and attribute belief. 
^8	  There may be different notions of belief at play in this kind of experimental work (Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri 2015).
^9	  This research links up nicely with work on nonhuman animals’ ability to understand that seeing leads to knowing. While research on the relation between perceptual and epistemic states is extensive, it is often limited to discussion of nonhuman animals’ theory of mind abilities. 
^10	  Intentions admit of at least two varieties: future directed (or prospective) intention and present intention (or intention-in-action) (Bratman 1987, Searle 1983). Future-directed intentions form a general plan for action that is consistent with one’s goals and one’s beliefs about the world. Present intentions inherit the general action plan from future-directed intention and specify the means of achieving the action. Future-directed and present intention differ with respect to their functional role, content, and specification of action plan, and how they are subject to rationality constraints. There may be temporal overlap between future-directed and present intentions. See Spaulding (2017) for more on the philosophical conception of intentions. There is no empirical work looking at whether ordinary folk in fact attribute these two kinds of intentions, but the distinction is intuitive. When I see my husband making a grocery list that includes, among other things, butter, eggs, flour, and chocolate chips, I infer that he has the (future-directed) intention to make chocolate chip cookies. Later, when I see him turning on the oven, searching for baking soda and sugar, pulling out the KitchenAid mixer, etc., I infer that he has the (present) intention to make cookies. The relevant point here is that we could attribute different kinds of intentions (future-directed or present) to a target in an attempt to explain and predict their behavior. 
^11	  See also Perner and Roessler (2010). This analysis of intention attribution is more focused on analyzing intentional action in terms of belief and desire attribution, however. Thus, although it marks some expansion beyond the typical construal of mindreading it is grounded pretty firmly in belief-desire psychology.
^12	  Stereotypes may be accurate or inaccurate, appropriately applied or inappropriately applied. Inaccurate or inappropriate stereotype attribution may lead us to make mindreading mistakes. For more on what I call mind misreading, see Spaulding (2016). Recently, Westra (forthcoming) has pushed back on the pessimistic perspective on stereotypes. He argues that stereotypes may actually be relatively statistically accurate, though of course those statistics may be encoding societal and institutional discrimination. Interestingly, current methodologies actually cannot tell whether our naturalistic mindreading inferences generally are accurate. Thus, it could be the case that stereotype-based mindreading typically is accurate. We just do not know. See Spaulding (forthcoming) for a reply to these arguments. 
^13	  Yuill and Pearson (1998) find that around age 5, children are able to conceive of traits as internal causal mechanisms of behavior (rather than mere regularities of behavior). This understanding seems to be mediated by an understanding of the subjectivity of desire, i.e., that desires are subjective and differ between individuals. Understanding that individuals have subjective desires (that may not objectively good or appealing to others) allows children to infer stable personality traits, which allows them to explain and predict individuals’ idiosyncratic emotional responses to events and future behavior (Yuill and Pearson 1998). More recent research finds that 4- and 5-year-olds infer traits based on behavior and behavior based on traits (Liu, Gelman, and Wellman 2007). 
^14	  Liberman, Woodward, and Kinzler (2017), for example, empirically investigate the developmental relationship between social categorization on the one hand and stereotyping and prejudice on the other hand. The developmental timeline goes hand-in-hand with the kind of developmental timeline demonstrated in the theory of mind scale discussed above  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (Wellman, Fang, and Peterson 2011, Wellman and Liu 2004). 
^15	  This section is based on parts of chapter 4 of my book (Spaulding 2018a). In that chapter, I also consider whether each of these types of explanations is causal. In particular, the issue of whether teleological and formal explanations are causal turns out to be interesting and relevant to the account of mindreading I argue for there. 
^16	  Lombrozo (2012) clarifies that explanations may not all have the same function (see, for instance, rationalizing explanations), and it is unlikely that individuals have the explicit goal of fulfilling the function of the type of explanation they are generating or accepting. 
